Suppliers are increasingly being asked to share information about their vulnerability to climate change and their strategies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. They vary widely in their responses. We theorize and empirically identify several factors associated with suppliers being especially willing to share this information with buyers, focusing on attributes of the buyers seeking this information and of the suppliers being asked to provide it. We test our hypotheses using data from the Carbon Disclosure Project's Supply Chain Program, a collaboration of multinational corporations requesting such information from thousands of suppliers in 49 countries. We find evidence that suppliers are more likely to share this information when requests from buyers are more prevalent, when buyers appear committed to using the information, and when suppliers belong to more profitable industries. Moreover, we find evidence that these three factors also influence the comprehensiveness of the information suppliers share and their willingness to share the information publicly. Finally, we find that suppliers in countries with greenhouse gas regulations are more likely to share greenhouse gas emissions levels and reduction targets.
Introduction
A growing number of firms are responding to climate change by attempting to mitigate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in their operations and supply chains.
1 Reducing the carbon footprint of companies'
operations represents an enormous opportunity. The 2,500 largest global corporations account for more than 20 percent of global GHG emissions, yet emissions resulting from corporate operations are typically exceeded by those associated with their supply chains (Carbon Disclosure Project 2011a). There is a growing awareness of the vulnerabilities of supply chains to risks and potential costs associated with the physical and regulatory threats related to global climate change (Enkvist and Vanthournout 2008 , Gunther 2010 , Halldórsson and Kovács 2010 , Haverkort and Verhagen 2008 , Hodge 2011 , Lash and Wellington 2007 , Kiron et al. 2012 , Kolk and Pinkse 2004 , Van Bergen et al. 2008 , Wolfsegger et al. 2008 .
Suppliers are vulnerable to climate change to the extent that their business activities are likely to be adversely affected by physical changes and regulations related to climate change.
2
On the upside, managing greenhouse gas emissions has also been shown to enhance brand and market value in some circumstances (Hopkins 2010 , Chapple et al. forthcoming, Griffin et al. 2011 , Griffin and Sun 2012 , Kim and Lyon 2011 , Matsumura et al. 2011 ). This combination of managing risks and pursuing opportunities 1 Seminal reports documenting the evidence supporting the link between GHG emissions and climate change include IPCC (2007) and Fitzpatrick (2006) . 2 Our notion of vulnerability is consistent with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's description of climate change vulnerability as a function of exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2007: 64, Schneider et al. 2007 ) and with other studies that operationalize vulnerability in a similar fashion (e.g., Donnelly 2011 , Finley and Schuchard 2011 , Sussman and Freed 2008 .
has led many managers to try to better understand supply chain management in conjunction with climate change.
Gathering information from suppliers about their climate change vulnerabilities and GHG emissions enables buyers to benchmark and to identify cost-and risk-reduction opportunities. In addition, information about supplier vulnerabilities to climate change can help companies make better decisions to mitigate risks associated with GHG regulation and with climate change's forecasted physical effects (U.S.
General Services Administration 2010). Information about supply chain GHG emissions is also being used by companies such as PepsiCo to develop carbon-footprint product labels, with the hope of differentiating products and increasing sales. Little is known about the circumstances that might encourage or deter suppliers from sharing climate change information-information about their vulnerability to the physical manifestations and regulatory responses to climate change, their GHG emission levels, and their reduction strategies-with their buyers. In operations management, information sharing has been used to manage supply chain risks, but most research on information sharing in supply chains has focused on sharing operational parameters such as demand forecasts and inventory levels in order to mitigate supply chain disruptions (Cachon 2003 , Chen 2003 , Lee and Whang 2000 . The scant research that has examined the use of shared information to manage other types of risk, such as reputational damage and accidents, has largely focused on the adoption of management system standards such as ISO 9001 and ISO 14001 (e.g., Anderson et al. 1999 , Corbett 2006 , Darnall 2006 , Delmas and Montiel 2009 , Levine and Toffel 2010 and codes of conduct governing workplace conditions (e.g., Locke et al. 2007, Weil and Mallo 2007) . Despite the growing interest of managers and policymakers in addressing climate change and an emerging awareness of the potential role of supply chain management, no prior research of which we are aware has examined the conditions under which suppliers and buyers are particularly likely to coordinate efforts to address climate change. We begin to address this opportunity by theorizing circumstances in which suppliers are especially likely to share climate change information with their buyers. We focus on attributes of both the buyers seeking this information and of the suppliers being asked to provide it. We test our hypotheses using proprietary data from the Carbon Disclosure Project's Supply Chain Program, a collaboration of multinational corporations that requested information about their key suppliers' GHG emissions as well as their vulnerabilities and opportunities associated with climate change. This empirical context provides an unusual opportunity to examine how a variety of suppliers respond to a simultaneous request from various buyers.
We identify several certain buyer and supplier attributes that contribute to supplier's decision about sharing climate change information, and that supply chain factors significantly improve our understanding of this decision. Specifically, suppliers are more likely to share this information when they face more buyers requesting it, which we theorize is because suppliers interpret these requests to be part of an emerging social movement rather than idiosyncratic requests. Suppliers are also more likely to share this information when their buyers convey a commitment to use it in their future procurement decisions.
Suppliers operating in more profitable industries are also more likely to share climate information with buyers. Moreover, we find that these factors are also associated with suppliers sharing more comprehensive information, sharing key metrics, and sharing the requested information with the public.
Suppliers in more GHG-intensive industries are just as likely as those in less GHG-intensive industries to share climate change information, but those in more GHG-intensive industries that do share climate change information are especially likely to share GHG emissions data, owing perhaps to their greater likelihood of having already conducted a GHG inventory. While we find no evidence that suppliers in countries with GHG emission regulations were more likely to share climate change information per se-which countered our expectation-suppliers in these countries that did share information shared it more comprehensively and were more likely to share GHG emissions data and reduction targets.
Related Literature
Our examination of the circumstances under which suppliers are particularly likely to share environmental information with their buyers builds on three literature streams: organizational adoption of practices and standards, information sharing in the supply chain, and corporate environmental disclosure.
We describe how our study addresses and differs from each of these literature streams.
Organizational Adoption of Practices and Standards
Several studies have examined how buyers have sought to cascade their social and environmental values through their supply chains by pressuring suppliers to adopt particular environmental and labor management practices, process standards such as the ISO 14001 Environmental Management System standard, and codes of conduct governing working conditions. These studies found that the diffusion of such practices and standards was promoted by particular organizational, national, and supply chain characteristics. For example, adoption of various environmental practices is more likely among suppliers that are larger and more environmentally aware and that have slack resources and specialized assets (Lee 2008, Delmas and Montiel 2009) and is also more likely in countries with more stringent regulations, stronger legal institutions, and regulatory requirements to publicly disclose pollution data Montiel 2009, Locke et al. 2007) . Adoption is more likely when the buyers' and suppliers' countries share similar cultures, regulations, and levels of corruption (Ciliberti et al. 2008) . Suppliers are also more willing to adopt practices advocated by buyers that provide technical assistance and training (for example, in production planning and quality management), that engage in joint problem solving, that share best practices (Lee 2008 , and with whom they have collaborative, cooperative, and longer relationships Romis 2007, Jiang 2009 ). Anecdotal evidence suggests that buyers with market power can also more effectively motivate their suppliers to adopt particular management practices (Barrientos and Smith 2006) .
In a broader context, there is also a vast literature that focuses on factors affecting the adoption of practices and quality standards, such as ISO 9001, ISO 14001, CMM, the Responsible Care Program, and TQM but that does not focus on the supply chain context. This literature finds that organizational characteristics, national contexts, trade relations, and market pressure contributed to adoption of these practices and standards.
A host of organizational characteristics have been found to be positively associated with the adoption of practices and quality standards, including an organization's size Toffel 2010, Potoski and Prakash 2005) , injury costs, occupational mix (Levine and Toffel 2010) , cost effectiveness (Gopal and Gao 2009) , available capital resources and governmental technical assistance (Darnall 2006) , historical compliance record (Potoski and Prakash 2005) , and prior experience with voluntary standards, pollution management, quality control, and inventory management (Delmas and Montiel 2008 , Delmas and Montes-Sancho 2011 , Darnall and Edwards 2006 . Studies have identified many institutional features that promote the adoption of these practices and standards, including the stringency of related laws and regulatory pressure (Darnall and Edwards 2006 , Delmas and Montiel 2008 , Delmas and MontesSancho 2011 , Potoski and Prakash 2005 , the prevalence of international nongovernmental organizations (Delmas and Montiel 2008) , and the focal organization's cultural similarities with and geographic proximity to previous adopters (Albuquerque et al. 2007, Delmas and Montes-Sancho 2011) .
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While a good deal is known about these various factors associated with suppliers adopting environmental and labor practices, including when they are promoted by buyers, the extent to which these factors apply to suppliers deciding whether to share environmental information with their buyers remains unclear. Buyer requests of suppliers to share climate change information are based on the notion of encouraging transparency rather than demanding conformity to prescribed practices or standards. While the costs to a supplier of adopting prescribed operational practices can often be readily forecasted, sharing climate change information involves not only measurement cost but also great uncertainty as to how the buyer will interpret and use the information. Because the climate change context is still quite novel, suppliers may have no idea what buyers will consider to be acceptable or desirable management or performance levels. Whether the buyer files the information away or uses it to benchmark and then demand significant GHG emission reductions can impose dramatically different costs on the supplier. The challenge of such unclear benefits and costs enables us to develop novel theory and hypotheses to better understand the factors that motivate suppliers to share climate change information with their buyers.
Information Sharing in the Supply Chain
Our work also relates to studies of how buyers and suppliers can promote supply chain coordination, improve production-planning decisions, and reduce risk by sharing production parameters such as inventory levels and demand forecasts. While this literature focuses on assessing the value of information sharing, designing information-sharing mechanisms, and developing optimal information-sharing strategies (e.g., Cachon 2003 , Chen 2003 , Cachon and Fisher 2000 , Özer et al. 2010 , Kurtuluş et al. 2012 , several works study the circumstances that promote information sharing between supply chain partners. Greater willingness to share has been associated with firms that are particularly dependent on new products and that engage in more innovation in their organizational processes (Zhou and Benton 2007) . Supply chain partners are also more likely to share information the more longstanding their relationship and the more it is characterized by trust and a shared vision, by relationship-specific investments, and by an agreement not to share the information with other supply chain partners (Li 2002 , Li and Lin 2006 , Lee and Whang 2000 , Li and Zhang 2008 , Patnayakuni et al. 2006 .
3 Several papers have found that standards and practices diffuse more rapidly between countries with greater trade ties and international investments (Albuquerque et al. 2007 , Corbett 2006 , Delmas and Montes-Sancho 2011 , Gopal and Gao 2009 , which in a coarse manner reflects macroeconomic buyer-supply linkages. Similarly, one study found that suppliers were more likely to adopt the ISO 14001 standard if their buyers had adopted it (Delmas and Toffel 2008) .
While this literature highlights the importance of mutual trust and cooperation, very few studies specifically motivate suppliers to share information with buyers. Moreover, the information-sharing literature has focused on operational metrics to the exclusion of increasingly important environmental and social information. Also, whereas sharing operational parameters typically involves information that one party already has available, such as inventory or demand forecasts, sharing climate change information often requires investment in areas quite outside the firm's core competency.
Corporate Environmental Disclosure
The literature on corporate environmental disclosure focuses on information disclosed to regulators, investors, and the public through financial and sustainability reports. Greater disclosure has been found among firms that are larger and more profitable or are more dependent on capital markets and foreign sales (Bewley and Li 2000 , Patten 1991 , Cormier and Magnan 2003 , Alnajjar 2000 , Stanny and Ely 2008 , Meek et al. 1995 . Disclosure propensity differs by industries and by region (Bewley and Li 2000 , Patten 1991 , Cormier and Magnan 2003 . Firms also tend to disclose more and higher-quality environmental information when faced with heightened scrutiny by investors (Stanny and Ely 2008 , Reid and Toffel 2009 ), regulators (Short and Toffel 2008 , Deegan and Rankin 1996 , and the media (Brown and Deegan 1998 , Bewley and Li 2000 , Cormier and Magnan 2003 , Cormier et al. 2004 ).
This literature stream examines disclosure to regulators, investors, and the public but not-to the best of our knowledge-supply chain partners. It is unclear the extent to which this literature's findings apply to suppliers' decisions to share environmental information with their buyers in a business-tobusiness context (rather than with consumers).
Theory and Hypotheses
Voluntary information disclosure has mostly been studied as an information asymmetry problem featuring adverse selection (Akerlof 1970 , Spence 1973 , where the agent possesses private information that is unknown to the principal. Although there are many variants of this setting, the fundamental decision by the agent is to maximize its payoff by deciding whether or not to disclose this information, given the expected response by the principal (Verrecchia 2001) . In this context, the supplier's decision to disclose is based on trade-offs between the costs and benefits of disclosure.
In our context, suppliers must weigh the necessary investments against the implications for their competitive position. Research has shown that adopting environmental initiatives can be expensive (King et al. 2005 , Delmas 2002 system. Firms engaging in these efforts also bear the opportunity cost of the required capital and personnel time. Suppliers weigh these investments against the potential impact on their competitive position, such as whether they will be better positioned to win or retain contracts, whether these tasks can help them develop capabilities that can differentiate them from competitors, and whether responding will help them avoid penalties that might arise from not responding.
While some of the costs are relatively easy to quantify, the newness of this context and the rapidly changing public and political views regarding climate change render other costs and benefits highly uncertain. For example, since there is no established benchmark for an acceptable level of suppliers' GHG emissions, a supplier might not know whether the information it shares will be viewed by its buyers as acceptable or unacceptable and whether sharing information will bring new business or new and costly requirements. The uncertainty about whatever carbon costs would result from GHG emissions regulations and the uncertainty over changing consumer preferences for less carbon-intensive products and services challenge suppliers to anticipate what-if any-strategic benefits might be achieved by sharing climate change information with their buyers.
We propose a framework that describes the factors that affect a supplier's perceived costs and benefits of sharing information with its buyers. We categorize these factors into two groups:
characteristics of the buyer seeking the information and characteristics of the supplier from whom the information is being sought. Regarding the demand for information, we hypothesize that the breadth and the depth of buyer pressure will affect the suppliers' decisions whether or not to comply with buyers' requests to provide climate change information. From the suppliers' side, we hypothesize that their profitability, their vulnerability to stakeholder scrutiny, and the relative investment required for them to share information contribute to their decision whether or not to share climate change information with buyers.
Characteristics of Demand for Information Sharing
Suppliers, already occupied with running their businesses, receive many information requests from buyers and other stakeholders (Chatterji and Levine 2006) . Because gathering information to respond to such requests is costly (King et al. 2005 , Delmas 2002 ), we theorize that suppliers will prioritize more salient requests and that requests acquire salience when (a) they appear to be part of a growing trend rather than idiosyncratic and (b) suppliers face buyers who appear more committed to using the shared information.
In other words, we argue that suppliers will be influenced by the breadth and depth of the pressure they face from buyers. trend rather than idiosyncratic, they will anticipate greater benefits from sharing the information, as the cost of fulfilling the request can be seen as a smaller investment to be allocated across the current and future requests. They may also see a refusal to share the information as a risk to their legitimacy and to future orders. More buyers requesting the same information indicates greater breadth of pressure-a greater likelihood that the request is part of a trend and worth a response. We therefore propose:
Hypothesis 1: Sharing climate change information with buyers is more likely when suppliers face more buyers requesting this information.
The Depth of Buyer Pressure.
Prior research has found that buyers' mandating that their suppliers adopt particular management standards leads to the diffusion of those standards throughout the supply chain (Anderson et al. 1999 , Delmas and Montiel 2009 , Delmas and Toffel 2008 , Henriques and Sadorsky 1996 . In our context, however, buyer requests for information are not mandates and the penalties-if any-of not responding are very unclear. Buyers requesting climate change information from their suppliers exhibit different levels of commitment to using this information. Our interviews with sustainability officers at some buyers requesting climate change information from their suppliers indicated that they had no current plans to use the information but thought the data might eventually be useful and that seeking the information was virtually costless (Personal communication with a representative from a buying organization, July 2010). In another example, a Fortune 500 manufacturer referred to the program as a "half-built bridge to nowhere" after the firm had been asked to complete the questionnaire "for its top customer but could not find a person at the customer organization that could answer basic questions, such as how the data would be used" (Baier 2012 ).
Some companies have expanded their supplier scorecards to include suppliers' willingness to share GHG information, modified their standard request for proposals (RFP) to include climate change information sharing, and added sustainability language to their supplier agreements (Baier 2012 , Baxter International 2009 , Vodafone 2009 ). Dell, for example, in requesting its suppliers to respond to the CDP Supply Chain Program questionnaire, states: "Failure to meet these requirements can impact your supplier ranking and potentially diminish your ability to compete for Dell's business" (Way 2010) , although, even in this case, the cautious phrasing ("can," "potentially") conveys uncertainty about how important the information really is to future procurement decisions. In another example, climate change management is one of Vodafone's six "corporate sustainability pillars" by which supplier performance is measured (Vodafone 2009 ).
Suppliers are likely to perceive more intense pressure from those buyers that plan to use the requested information in their criteria for supplier selection (or retention) and/or as part of procurement contract terms. Indeed, our interviews indicated that buyers often found it difficult to obtain information from suppliers unless the supplier perceived the request to be relationship-critical. Buyers conveying their commitment to use suppliers' climate change information 4 are more likely to lead their suppliers to anticipate greater benefits from sharing the information and greater costs from refusing to do so. We therefore propose:
Hypothesis 2a: Suppliers are more likely to share climate change information with buyers that appear committed to using this information in future procurement decisions.
Alternatively, suppliers might be especially deterred from sharing information with buyers committed to using it. Since "appropriate" levels of climate change management attention and GHG emissions performance have yet to be well established, suppliers risk sharing information that a buyer might judge to be poor when benchmarked against other suppliers. 5 This reasoning is supported by Verrecchia (2001) , which stated that a reason for withholding information when disclosure is voluntary is the uncertainty concerning the types of player involved. In our context, the uncertainty concerns both the buyer's type (how the buyer will react to the disclosed information) and the supplier's type (how the supplier compares to other suppliers). For example, when a supplier requests a price increase due to rising energy costs, few would expect the buyer to consult the energy and climate risk management information that the supplier shared via the CDP Supply Chain Program, but this is what Imperial Tobacco Group does (Carbon Disclosure Project 2011a). In addition, sharing data with buyers could lead them to ask suppliers to incur additional costs, such as Dell's its intention to "work with suppliers on emissions reduction strategies once data is collected" (Newton 2007) . Such concerns would make suppliers less likely to disclose climate change information to buyers that appear especially committed to using it because the stakes would be higher. We therefore propose:
Hypothesis 2b: Suppliers are less likely to share climate change information with buyers that appear committed to using this information in future procurement decisions.
Characteristics of Information Providers
Not only the buyer's attributes, but also attributes of a supplier's own competitive and institutional context will influence its propensity to share climate change information with a buyer. We focus on the profitability of a supplier's industry, the supplier's vulnerability to scrutiny from stakeholders regarding climate change, and the extent to which the investment required for it to share climate change information is reduced through operating in a domain featuring GHG emissions regulations.
3.2.1. Profitability. Firms often provide their highest-quality service to attract and retain the most profitable customers. Airlines offer first-class customers special treatment, some customer call centers prioritize the most profitable customers (Klungle and Maluchnik 1997) , and some companies deprioritize the quality of service to their least profitable customers (Wagner 2006) . This anecdotal evidence is supported by theoretical work that shows that bouts of extremely high service quality enhance customer retention (Bolton et al. 2006 ) and by empirical research that reveals high returns to investing in the loyalty of high-value customers (Reichheld 1993 (Reichheld , 1996 . Literature on newsvendor stocking quantities also indicates that firms maintain a higher service level for more profitable customers (Porteus 1990 ). We argue that, in this regard, agreeing to a buyer's requests for information can be treated as high-quality service. Suppliers in highly profitable industries are more likely to agree to such requests than those in less profitable industries such as commodities, where competition is based on price rather than service.
Suppliers in more profitable industries (a) face higher opportunity costs of losing buyers and thus have greater incentives to retain them and (b) are more likely to be able to afford to invest in gathering the requested information; for example, by developing a GHG inventory. We therefore propose:
Hypothesis 3: Sharing climate change information with buyers is more likely among suppliers operating in more profitable industries.
Vulnerability to Stakeholder Scrutiny. Suppliers in GHG-intensive industries are more
likely to face public scrutiny and pressure from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) regarding climate change (Dierkes and Preston 1977, Patten 1991) and are more likely to be targeted or threatened by GHG regulations. Similarly, they are more likely to be prioritized for scrutiny by buyers and investors seeking to manage their climate change vulnerabilities and to reduce GHG emissions. Those that refuse to share climate change information are likely to be targets of even greater NGO scrutiny (Stanny 2010) , which can increase their costs. Research has shown firms seek to avoid the costs and risks associated with being scrutinized (Deegan 2002, Short and and that sharing environmental information is one way to bolster legitimacy and alleviate scrutiny on environmental matters (Hogner 1982 , Patten 1992 , Neu et al. 1998 ). We therefore propose:
Hypothesis 4: Sharing climate change information with buyers is more likely among suppliers operating in GHG-intensive industries.
Investment Required for Information Sharing.
Different suppliers would need to make different investments in order to share information with buyers. One important factor is whether regulations already require the company to gather related information. In our context, suppliers in countries where regulations already call for at least some of the requested information or similar information will require less investment to gather and analyze the data necessary to share climate change information with their buyers. For example, for suppliers subject to regulations that require them to identify and calculate their GHG emissions and to develop a reporting system, sharing this information with buyers requires little additional investment.
Even suppliers in countries where GHG regulations target companies in other industries but not their own are likely to require lower investments to calculate their GHG emissions than suppliers in unregulated countries will require. GHG emissions regulations create a market of service providers to support the development of GHG inventories in that country, so even suppliers whose GHG emissions are not regulated have superior access to such services. In addition, institutional theory predicts that regulations legitimize certain norms and preferences (Scott 1995) . In our context, a country's GHG regulations legitimize the management of climate change impacts and being transparent about these efforts, while also lowering the cost of doing so, both of which would tend to delegitimize a supplier's refusal to disclose climate change information. We therefore propose:
Hypothesis 5: Sharing climate change information with buyers is more likely among suppliers in countries with GHG emissions regulation.
Data and Measures

Data and Sample
We tested our hypotheses in the context of the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP)'s Supply Chain
Program, which involves a group of multinational corporations (buyers) interested in learning about their key suppliers' vulnerabilities to climate change, strategies to address these vulnerabilities, and GHG emission levels. Participating buyers included financial companies such as National Australia Bank, hightechnology firms including Dell and IBM from the United States, consumer product firms such as
France's L'Oréal and the United Kingdom's Unilever, and energy service firms such as Italy's Enel.
Each buyer provided CDP with a list of the suppliers from whom it sought data. 6 Buyers typically emphasized suppliers that accounted for a significant portion of the buyer's spending (Personal communication with CDP representative, July 2011). On behalf of these buyers, CDP, a UK-based NGO that maintains the world's largest database of corporate climate change information (Carbon Disclosure Project 2011b), surveyed nearly 2,500 suppliers in 49 countries.
Our empirical context offers a unique opportunity to examine how suppliers in different industries around the world respond to an identical set of questions asked simultaneously by a variety of buyers. Each year, all of the suppliers surveyed received an email from CDP on the same date, explaining the online questionnaire and inviting them, on behalf of their particular buyer(s), to complete the questionnaire. When each supplier accesses the online questionnaire using a custom URL, that supplier immediately sees a list of its buyers that are requesting this information from it.
While the online questionnaire is administered through CDP, buyers also communicate directly with their suppliers to inform them about this request and to encourage them to share the information.
Before CDP sends its questionnaire, CDP asked each buyer to send letters or emails to suppliers, Suppliers could respond privately or publicly. CDP shared private responses only with those buyers that had requested the information from that supplier. 8 Public responses were shared with the requesting buyers and were also posted on CDP's public website (www.cdproject.net).
The CDP Supply Chain Program is an extension of CDP's primary role of sending similar questionnaires to predominantly large, publicly traded companies on behalf of their institutional investors.
6 While the list of buyers participating in the CDP Supply Chain Program is publicly available on the CDP website, the list of suppliers is confidential and surveyed suppliers were not told by CDP whether any of their competitors had also received the questionnaire. 7 Our interviews with suppliers confirmed that they perceive the information request as coming from their buyers, although operationalized by CDP. For example, one supplier stated: "My understanding is that the requests are coming from the specific buyers who are listed on the request and that they are members of the CDP Supply Chain Program. I don't think CDP makes any requests on their own behalf." Another supplier confirmed this understanding: "In the CDP supply chain module, the request by definition comes directly from our customers." 8 Suppliers were not allowed to instruct CDP to share their responses with only a subset of their requesting buyers.
Prior studies examining CDP's Investor Program have identified several factors associated with these companies' decisions whether or not to publicly disclose their climate change information in response to the CDP questionnaire. Significant determinants include being larger, having more foreign sales, having been targets of environment-related shareholder resolutions, facing threats of climate change regulation, receiving repeated requests, having better environmental performance, and having higher media visibility (Reid and Toffel 2009 , Stanny and Ely 2008 , Dawkins and Fraas 2011 . Other studies have examined the content of these disclosures (Kolk and Pinkse 2007) and the stock market reactions (Griffin et al. 2010, Kim and Lyon 2011) . Our study differs from these studies in several ways. First, we examine factors related to supply chain relationships. Second, whereas the prior studies examined the disclosure behaviors of large, publicly owned multinational corporations, the suppliers in our sample are significantly more heterogeneous in size and include both privately held and publicly owned companies. Third, whereas most of the prior studies focused on a single country, we examine responses from suppliers in 49 countries, allowing us to exploit variation across institutional environments. Fourth, whereas the prior studies focused on the decision to publicly disclose climate change information, we focus on the decision to share this information with buyers. We also explore whether there are different determinants of sharing this information privately with buyers and of disclosing it publicly. Table 1 . Our unit of analysis is the supplier-year. ****************************** Insert Table 1 about here ****************************** 4.2.1. Independent Variables. We captured the degree to which buyer requests were indicative of a social movement rather than being idiosyncratic via number of buyer requests, the number of buyers that asked a particular supplier to share climate change information through the CDP questionnaire in a given year. We obtained data for this measure from CDP. To reduce skew, we use the logged value in our models.
To capture the extent to which suppliers perceived their buyers to be more committed to actually using the requested climate change information, we obtained data from CDP Supply Chain Program staff about each buyer's formal mechanism (if any) to incorporate suppliers' responses into future procurement decisions. As we saw earlier, Dell warns its suppliers that failure to respond "can impact your supplier ranking and potentially diminish your ability to compete for Dell's business" (Way 2010) . We created climate change as a buying criterion as a dichotomous variable coded "1" for suppliers that faced at least one requesting buyer whose supplier scorecard, RFP process, or other supplier evaluation scheme incorporated responses to the CDP Supply Chain questionnaire and "0" if the supplier had no such buyer.
This measure differentiates suppliers facing buyers portraying a commitment to use the requested information from those suppliers whose buyers who do not portray such a commitment.
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Because so many suppliers in our sample are privately held companies located around the world, we were unable to obtain firm-level profit margin data for most suppliers in our sample. We instead measure the profitability of each supplier's industry based on the median profit margin of its industry in its country. We calculated the profit margin (net income divided by sales) of all companies in the Worldscope database, which includes more than 95% of the world's publicly traded companies. Finding large variation across countries in the profit margins of companies within the same industry (four-digit Global Industry Classification Standard [GICS] code), we calculated the median profit margin within each industry-country dyad to capture the prevailing profitability of the industry each supplier faced. We chose median rather than mean to avoid contamination by outliers.
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We gauge a supplier's vulnerability to climate change regulations by the GHG-intensity of its industry. Using data obtained from Trucost, we measure industry's GHG intensity in metric tons of GHG per million U.S. dollars of revenue in 2009 for each six-digit GICS code. We linked this to our sample based on six-digit GICS codes obtained from Capital IQ. We recoded the remaining 569 cases for which we could not obtain these data from "missing" to "0" and included in our models a corresponding dichotomous variable coded "1" for observations for which such recoding had been conducted and "0" otherwise. Using the average of these profit margins over two prior years yielded results similar to our primary results. 12 In the United States, a facility's prior experience reporting to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) program, which focuses on toxic chemicals, is unlikely to affect its costs of gathering and reporting the GHG data sought by the CDP questionnaire. The agency estimated that gathering and reporting GHG emissions would cost an average $10,400 per facility, but would be much higher for facilities in some of the most populous industries covered by TRI; for example, $41,000 per petroleum refinery and $27,000 per petrochemical production facility (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2009: pages 5-1 and 5-5 and Table 4 -62). 13 Estimates of the hypothesized results were nearly identical when we controlled for the relative power of the supplier and its largest buyer by including in our models the ratio of the largest buyer's revenue to the supplier's revenue, either in addition to or instead of the two separate components.
recoded missing values to "0." We also obtained data for supplier's revenue (in U.S. dollars) from Capital IQ, but only for 36 percent of our sample (1,163 of 3,226 supplier-year observations). We recoded the missing values to "0." In our models, we used one-year lagged values of both variables and logged each of them (after adding 1) to reduce skew. We also included in our models corresponding dichotomous variables coded "1" to denote observations for which recoding-to-zero had been conducted and coded "0" otherwise.
We measure country's environmental governance in each supplier's country based on executives'
perceptions of (1) that country's pollution levels, (2) the extent to which environmental challenges negatively impact business operations in that country, and (3) the stringency of that country's environmental regulations and enforcement. We obtained these data from the World Economic Forum's annual Executive Opinion Surveys, in which executives scored each of these dimensions using a sevenpoint Likert scale ranging from "1" for "extremely weak" to "7" for "extremely strong-the best in the world." Because this set of questions changed slightly during our sample period, we calculated annual country averages (rather than relying on factor-analysis scores) to avoid having our measure be overly dependent on our particular sample (Wainer 1976 We control for the potential for management decisions to be influenced by industry norms and trends (Delmas and Toffel 2012 , DiMaggio and Powell 1983 , Meyer and Rowan 1977 . We created a set of supplier industry dummies based on their two-digit GICS codes, using information from Capital IQ whenever available or else from supplier responses to CDP. 14 Our industry dummies had to be fairly coarse to afford ample variation of our hypothesized industry measures (GHG intensity and profit margins) within these categories. 15 We created an unknown industry dummy to denote the 506 observations for which we could not obtain industry information from either of these sources. While these dummies control for time-invariant industry characteristics, managers might interpret the number of CDP 14 The industry dummies also control for potential measurement error issues, such as the possibility that there are unobserved buyer requests that are not managed through CDP and the number of which varies by suppliers' industries. 15 As a robustness test, we estimated a model controlled for industry using 25 dummies corresponding to 4-digit GICS codes obtained from Capital IQ and CDP data, which yielded coefficients nearly identical to our primary model.
Supply Chain requests they receive in light of industry trends. We therefore also control for the log (after adding 1) of mean buyer requests each year within each supplier's industry (two-digit GICS code).
16
Tables 2 and 3 report summary statistics and correlations for all of these variables. Panel B of Table 1 reports the distribution of industries.
***************************** Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here *****************************
Method and Results
Model Specification
We test our hypotheses by estimating the following model:
where Y ijct refers to whether supplier i in industry j located in county c shared climate change information in year t. Also, because managers might decide whether or not to share climate change information in light of industry trends, we include u jt , which captures the annual mean buyer requests in each supplier's industry.
Results
We use logistic regression to estimate our model that predicts a dichotomous dependent variable. Because our dataset includes some suppliers that were surveyed in both 2009 and 2010, we report robust standard errors clustered by supplier, which accommodates heteroskedasticity as well as the non-independence of these suppliers' responses over the two-year sample period.
We begin by estimating a baseline model that includes only attributes of the supplier and its institutional environment-which have been the focus of the environmental information disclosure literature so far-and omitting all supply-chain-related variables. We find that being located in a country with GHG emissions regulation (β = 0.20; p < 0.05) and having also received a CDP Investor questionnaire (β = 0.88; p < 0.01) are positive and significant in predicting suppliers sharing climate change information, while being in industries more vulnerable to climate change regulation does not contribute significantly to suppliers sharing climate change information.
********************* Insert Table 4 about here ********************* Columns 2a and 2b of Turning to our independent variables, the results yield support for both of our hypothesized demand-side factors. A significant positive coefficient on number of buyer requests (β = 0.78; p < 0.01)
indicates that the greater the number of buyers requesting climate change information from a supplier, the more likely that supplier is to provide it, which supports Hypothesis 1. The average marginal effect indicates that a one-log-unit increase in the number of requesting buyers is associated with a 14.0-percentage-point increase in the probability of sharing climate change information.
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The significant positive coefficient on climate change as a buying criterion (β = 0.85; p < 0.01)
indicates that a buyer's apparent commitment to use its suppliers' climate change information in future procurement decisions increases, rather than decreases, the probability that suppliers will share that information. This supports Hypothesis 2a rather than Hypothesis 2b. The average marginal effect indicates that having at least one requesting buyer using climate change as a buying criterion boosts the 17 Concerned that obtaining data for supplier's revenue for only 36 percent of our sample might bias our results, we also estimated a variant of the primary model by omitting supplier's revenue, which yielded results (not shown) consistent with those of our primary model. 18 One might be concerned that suppliers might take more seriously requests from buyers located in countries with more stringent environmental governance. We estimated three additional models, each with an alternative measure of environmental governance in the buyer's country: (1) 19 Estimating the model after substituting the unlogged number of requesting buyers for the logged value also yielded a similarly significant positive coefficient.
probability of a supplier sharing that information by 15.5 percentage points, increasing the average predicted probability from 46.8 percent to 62.4 percent. This finding is robust to several alternatives to our dichotomous measure, including the proportion of requesting buyers using climate change as a buying criterion, the number of requests from buyers using climate change as a buying criterion, and the largest revenue of a requesting buyer using climate change as a buying criterion.
From the supplier's side, the significant and positive coefficient on median profit margin (β = Finding no significant direct effect of supplier industry's GHG intensity on the propensity to share climate change information with buyers in our primary model, we explored the possibility that industry's GHG intensity might have an indirect effect via other independent variables. To do so, we examined whether our other determinants of sharing climate change information differed between suppliers in higher-versus lower-GHG-intensity industries by estimating our primary model (excluding industry's GHG intensity) on two subsamples distinguished by being above or below the 6-digit GICS 20 This measure is based on estimates of U.S. industries obtained from the National Center for Manufacturing Sciences' Environmental Roadmapping Initiative 21 This lack of significance holds whether we included or excluded the industry dummies and whether we coded this measure based on 2-digit or 6-digit GICS codes. 22 The likelihood ratio test statistic is assumed to be chi-square distributed with degrees of freedom equal to the difference in the number of parameters between the two models. Thus, this test accounts for the models having different numbers of explanatory variables.
sample median. 23 The results of estimates on both subsamples yielded coefficients on the four remaining hypothesized variables of the same sign as in our primary model. Whereas Wald tests indicated that the coefficients on three of these variables were indistinguishable across the subsamples, the coefficients on number of buyer requests statistically differed (Wald χ 2 = 6.60; p < 0.05). An additional buyer request has a greater impact on the likelihood of sharing climate change information for suppliers in low-GHGintensity industries (average marginal effect = 0.24) than it does for suppliers in high-GHG-intensity industries (average marginal effect = 0.09). This led us to explore the interaction between the number of buyer requests and industry's GHG intensity. Adding this interaction term to the primary model yields a negative and significant coefficient (Table 3 , Column 4: β= -0.34; p < 0.05). Again, the results indicate that additional buyer requests give a smaller boost to the likelihood of sharing climate change information for suppliers in high-GHG-intensity industries than for suppliers in low-GHG-intensity industries. We speculate that requests for climate change information might be particularly salient for suppliers in low-GHG-intensity industries due to their not being as accustomed to examining their relationship to climate change, causing each additional request to have a greater effect on the likelihood of their sharing climate change information (compared to suppliers in industries that are more GHG-intensive). We encourage future research to better understand this and other contingent relationships.
Extensions
Response Comprehensiveness
The information that suppliers shared with buyers via the CDP Supply Chain Program questionnaire was not equally comprehensive. Our dichotomous primary dependent variable shared climate change information does not differentiate between suppliers that answered every question in the questionnaire and those that answered only one. It also does not differentiate between suppliers that provided meaningful answers to key questions and those that provided uninformative responses such as "not applicable."
To better capture different levels of response comprehensiveness, we coded an alternative dependent variable, the number of questions answered meaningfully by the supplier. We identified 19 core questions that were asked in both the 2009 and 2010 versions of the CDP questionnaire. These include questions about the supplier's risks and opportunities associated with climate change (six questions), GHG emissions levels (five), reductions in its GHG emissions and energy usage (three), 23 The lower-GHG-intensity group primarily included suppliers in the healthcare, financial, telecommunication services, and consumer discretionary industries. Suppliers in the higher-GHG-intensity group primarily included those in the energy, materials, and utilities industries.
governance of climate change issues (two), and engagement in climate change issues in its own supply chain (three). 24 For each supplier, we counted how many of these 19 questions were answered, excluding "not applicable" and empty responses. Among questionnaires that were at least partially completed, the median response included answers to 16 questions, with a mean of 14.9 questions. Among all questionnaires, including the 1506 in which none of the questions were answered, the median survey included answers to nearly half (9) of the 19 questions, with a mean of 7.95 questions.
We predicted number of questions answered, a count dependent variable, with the same set of independent and control variables used in our primary model. We use negative binomial regression because this count variable exhibits overdispersion (with variance 61.5 and mean 7.95). As before, the unit of analysis is the supplier-year. We report standard errors clustered by supplier, so our results are robust to heteroskedasticity and to non-independence among the two responses by those suppliers that responded in both years of the analysis.
Results from the negative binomial regression are reported in Column 4a, with average marginal effects reported in Column 4b. All of the hypothesized variables that our primary model (Columns 2a and 2b) indicated were significant determinants of sharing climate change information were also significant determinants of response comprehensiveness. For example, average marginal effects indicate that a onelog-point increase in number of buyer requests increases the number of questions answered by 0.77. A one-standard-deviation increase in median profit margin will increase the number of questions answered by 0.51. The use of climate change as a buying criterion (a change in value from 0 to 1) is associated with an average of four additional questions answered. These results indicate that the factors that significantly increased the likelihood of suppliers sharing climate change information with their buyers also predict the comprehensiveness of the information they share. Whereas Kyoto Annex I country was not a significant factor in predicting whether suppliers would share climate change information with their buyers, suppliers in Kyoto countries that did share did so more comprehensively, responding to an average of 1.6 additional questions (based on the average marginal effect). Suppliers in countries with GHG emission regulations are more likely to have already (a) considered the risks and opportunities associated with climate change, (b) invested in developing a GHG emissions inventory, (c) begun 24 These questions include whether a supplier perceives regulatory, physical, or other risks/opportunities associated with climate change; its emissions calculation methodology, its direct ("Scope 1") GHG emissions, GHG emissions from the consumption of purchased electricity, heat, or steam ("Scope 2"), and emissions intensity normalized by activities and financial indicators; whether it has a GHG-or energy-reduction target and, if so, the numeric target and related reduction activities; how the overall responsibility for climate change is managed in the supplier's organization; whether it publishes information about its risks and opportunities associated with climate change; its strategy for engaging its own suppliers on climate change issues and how it makes use of its own suppliers' data; and successes in reducing its products' life-cycle emissions and planned activities to do so.
formulating reduction targets, and (d) established a structure to manage climate change in their own organizations and in their supply chains.
Sharing Key Metrics
The analyses above have explored the determinants of (a) the supplier's decision to share climate change information with its buyers and (b) the comprehensiveness of the supplier's response, but have not distinguished whether or not the shared information included the elements of greatest interest to many buyers. Our interviews and CDP reports indicate that many buyers in our sample were motivated by the ultimate objective of reducing their extended carbon footprints (Carbon Disclosure Project 2010a, 2011a).
These buyers had requested climate information to learn whether or not their suppliers had begun measuring their GHG emissions and whether they had begun planning to reduce them. For example, approximate a third of Walmart's supplier sustainability assessment focuses on GHG emissions levels and reduction targets (Walmart 2009 ). GHG emissions levels and trends are also among the most common environment, health, and safety (EHS) metrics reported to senior management and are commonly used by stock analysts to evaluate corporate performance along environmental, social, and governance (ESG) dimensions (Soyka and Bateman 2012) .
With all this in mind, we extended our analysis to explore whether the determinants we hypothesized to influence suppliers to share climate change information with their buyers also motivated them to share quantitative GHG emissions data and GHG or energy reduction targets. While the CDP questionnaire requested but did not require suppliers to include these (or any other) elements, suppliers that chose to do so demonstrated that they had invested in calculating their GHG emissions and had given some thought to reduction goals.
We created shared reduction target as an ordinal variable, coded "0" when a supplier did not share climate change information in a given year, "1" when it shared climate change information but not a quantitative GHG or energy reduction target, and "2" when the shared information included a quantitative GHG or energy reduction target. Among the 1,721 supplier-year observations with shared climate change information, 696 included a quantitative reduction target and 1,025 did not.
Similarly, we created shared GHG emissions data as an ordinal variable, coded "0" when a supplier did not share climate change information in a given year, "1" when it shared climate change information but not quantitative GHG emissions data, and "2" when the shared information included quantitative GHG emissions data. 25 Among the 1,721 supplier-year observations with shared climate change information, 1,267 included quantitative GHG emissions data and 454 did not. 25 Our primary approach to coding this variable "2" considered only direct GHG emissions, referred to in the CDP questionnaire and the GHG Protocol (2012) as "Scope 1" emissions, a widely used GHG reporting standard.
We predicted shared reduction target and shared GHG emissions data with the same set of independent and control variables used in our primary model (Column 2 of Table 4 ). Since both of these dependent variables are ordered variables, we employed ordered logistic regression. The simplest form of ordered logistic regression is appropriate only to data that meet the proportional-odds assumption (that the relationship between any pair of outcome groups is statistically indistinguishable), which can be assessed using the Brant test (Long and Freese 2006) . Brant tests rejected the proportional-odds assumption for the models predicting shared reduction target and shared GHG emissions data, which led us to estimate these models instead with generalized ordered logistic regression. To create the most parsimonious model given our data, we used an iterative process to identify the partial proportional-odds model that best fit the data, relaxing the proportional-odds assumption only for those variables for which the coefficient estimates statistically varied across levels (evaluated at =0.05) (Williams 2006) . 26 As before, our unit of analysis is the supplier-year. Because we report standard errors clustered by supplier, our results are robust to heteroskedasticity and to non-independence of the two observations from those suppliers that responded in both years of the analysis ********************* Insert Table 5 about here ********************* Results of the generalized ordered logistic regression model predicting shared reduction target are reported in Columns 1a and 1b of Table 5 . Column 1a reports the extent to which the predictor variables shift the dependent variable from not sharing any information (where shared reduction target equals "0") to sharing information (where shared reduction target equals "1" or "2"). Column 1b reports the extent to which the predictor variables shift the dependent variable from not sharing a GHG reduction target (shared reduction target equals "0" or "1") to doing so (shared reduction target equals "2").
Because the results reported in Column 1a closely match (mechanically) those of our primary model (Column 2 of Table 4 ), we focus here on whether and how our hypothesized variables influence suppliers' sharing of their reduction targets (Column 1b).
Perhaps the most interesting result is that suppliers in a Kyoto Annex I country are especially likely to share reduction targets (β = 0.41; OR = 1.51; p < 0.01) and that their being in a Kyoto country has a significantly greater impact on sharing reduction targets than on sharing any climate change Alternatively, we coded this variable "2" when the shared information included direct GHG emissions and/or GHG emissions from the consumption of purchased electricity, heat, or steam (that is, Scope 1 or Scope 2), which yielded nearly identical results. 26 The iterative process described above yielded roughly 2% of observations with negative predicted probability values, which we resolved by imposing more parallel line restrictions (in our case, on all control variables), as advised by Williams (http://www.nd.edu/~rwilliam/gologit2/tsfaq.html).
information per se (a Wald test comparing this coefficient between Columns 1a and 1b yields χ 2 = 4.27; p < 0.05). Suppliers in countries with GHG emission regulations were more likely to share GHG or energy reduction targets, perhaps because they were more likely to have already invested in developing a GHG emissions inventory and to have begun formulating reduction targets.
The positive and significant coefficients on number of buyer requests, climate change as a buying criterion, and median profit margin indicate that the breadth of buyer pressure, the buyer's commitment to use shared information for future procurement decisions, and the profitability of the supplier's competitive environment are positively associated with sharing a GHG or energy reduction target. These results comport with those from the primary model, which predicts sharing any climate change information. In contrast to the Kyoto result discussed above, climate change as a buying criterion had a significantly greater impact on a supplier's decision to share climate change information than on its decision to share reduction targets (Wald test comparing this coefficient between Columns 1a and 1b yields χ 2 = 10.36; p < 0.01). This could suggest that buyers are still in the early stages of encouraging their suppliers to reveal the most critical elements for assessing and reducing the supply chain's carbon footprint.
Results for the model predicting shared GHG emissions data are reported in Columns 2a and 2b
of Table 5 . Column 2a reports the extent to which the predictor variables shift the dependent variable from not sharing any climate change information (where shared GHG emissions data equals "0") to sharing information (where shared GHG emissions data equals "1" or "2"), while column 2b reports the extent to which the predictor variables shift the dependent variable from not sharing GHG emissions data (shared GHG emissions data equals "0" or "1") to doing so (shared GHG emissions data equals "2"). As above, we focus on results associated with the second column, Column 2b.
The positive significant coefficients on number of buyer requests and climate change as a buying criterion comport with the results from the primary model (Column 2 of Table 4 ). Also, as with the results on shared reduction target, climate change as a buying criterion has a significantly stronger impact on suppliers' decision to share climate change information per se than on sharing GHG emissions data (Wald test comparing Columns 2a to 2b yields χ 2 = 4.51; p < 0.05).
Interestingly, being in a more profitable competitive environment has a significantly larger impact on suppliers' propensity to share climate change information per se than on their propensity to share GHG emissions data (Wald test comparing this coefficient between Columns 2a and 2b yields χ 2 = 5.70; p < 0.05). In contrast, the GHG intensity of the supplier's industry is a significantly stronger predictor of sharing GHG emissions data than of sharing climate change information per se (Wald test comparing this coefficient between Columns 2a and 2b yields χ 2 = 5.28; p < 0.05), owing perhaps to their greater likelihood of having already conducted a GHG inventory. Suppliers in Kyoto Annex I countries were also more likely to share GHG emissions data, although this effect was only marginally significant (p < 0.10), which is consistent with the idea that suppliers in countries subject to GHG regulations are more likely to already have GHG inventories or to have easier access to a developed expertise market to create an inventory compared to suppliers elsewhere.
To summarize, the prevalence of buyer requests, the commitment of buyers to use the shared climate change information in their future procurement decisions, and being in a country with GHG emissions regulation increased suppliers' propensity to share GHG emissions data and reduction targets.
Public Disclosure
Suppliers that choose to respond to the CDP Supply Chain Program questionnaire are given the choice of having CDP share their climate change information only with the requesting buyers or also posting it on CDP's public website. We extended our analysis to explore whether the determinants we hypothesized would influence suppliers to share climate change information with their buyers would also motivate them to share this information publicly. Viewing this as a continuum of transparency (nontransparent, transparent only to suppliers, or transparent to all), we created response transparency as an ordered variable coded "0" when the supplier did not share climate change information, "1" when the supplier shared privately by directing CDP to share its response only with its requesting buyers, and "2" when it shared publicly by directing CDP to share its response with its requesting buyers and to publish it online.
Our 3,226 supplier-year observations include 1,721 instances of suppliers sharing climate change information, privately in 734 instances and publicly in 987 instances.
We predicted response transparency with the same set of independent and control variables used in our primary model. As with the earlier models, the Brant test for this model rejected the proportionalodds assumption, which led us to estimate the model with generalized ordered logistic regression using the same iterative process described above that identifies the partial proportional-odds model that best fits the data. As before, our unit of analysis is the supplier-year. Because we report standard errors clustered by firm, our results are robust to heteroskedasticity and to non-independence of the two observations from those suppliers that responded in both years of the analysis.
The results are presented in Columns 3a and 3b in Table 5 . Column 3a reports the extent to which the predictor variables shift the dependent variable from not sharing any climate change information (where response transparency equals "0") to sharing this information (where response transparency equals "1" or "2"). Column 3b reports the extent to which the predictor variables shift the dependent variable from not sharing GHG emissions data publicly (response transparency equals "0" or "1") to doing so (response transparency equals "2").
The results indicate that the same hypothesized variables that have significant positive effects on sharing climate change information in our primary model (number of buyer requests, climate change as a buying criterion, and median profit margin) also have significant positive effects on suppliers sharing this information publicly. Moreover, both indicators of buyer pressure (number of buyer requests and climate change as a buying criterion) have a significantly greater impact on suppliers' decision to share climate change information per se (Column 3a) than on sharing this information publicly (Column 3b). (Wald tests comparing each coefficient between Column 3a and 3b yield χ 2 = 5.70; p < 0.05 and χ 2 = 5.70; p < 0.05, respectively). In one of our interviews, a supplier attributed its preference to disclose privately to "competitive issues. We do not want to disclose to our competitors our GHG target and energy usage"
(Personal communication with a representative from a supplier organization, September 2011). Our empirical finding and the anecdotal report of competitiveness concerns reveal a potential limitation in the ability of supply chain climate change initiatives to generate publicly available data.
Discussion
Contributions
Our research bridges the operations management information-sharing literature to the environmental information disclosure literature more typically explored in the field of strategy. Prior research had already identified some organization-, industry-, and country-level factors associated with greater environmental information disclosure. We build on this by revealing important supply chain factors, a dimension previously unexplored in this literature. Our results indicate that both the commitment and the number of requesting agents are important determinants of an organization's willingness to disclose environmental information and our primary model significantly improves the ability to predict disclosure compared to a baseline model that omits supply chain factors. Future empirical research grounded in institutional theory should therefore give stronger consideration to supply chain factors when predicting when organizations will conform to institutional pressures.
Our work also extends the operations management literature on using information sharing to mitigate supply chain risk. In contrast to that literature's typical focus on mitigating "known-unknown" Our work also contributes insights to the literature on the diffusion of social and environmental practices through supply chains. Environmental information sharing belongs to a class of managerial practices that focus more on process transparency than on a particular operational practice or performance level. The benefits and costs of environmental information sharing are therefore more uncertain than the benefits and costs of many other practices, since they depend on how buyers use the shared information and on the suppliers' own institutional environments. By developing theory about the trade-offs between the benefits and costs of information sharing, by hypothesizing how these cost and benefits are influenced by several factors related both to those who demand this information and to those who supply it (or refuse to), and by showing many of the effects empirically, our research advances understanding of the adoption of supply chain practices that are characterized by high uncertainty about benefits and costs. Moreover, while institutional (namely, industry and country) factors have been shown to predict the adoption of particular management practices, little research prior to ours has simultaneously examined institutional and organizational factors to predict suppliers' adoption of standards or practices promoted by buyers.
While ours is not the very first study to do so, the other studies that have done so have focused on suppliers meeting buyer requests to adopt operational standards (Delmas and Montiel 2009 , Lee 2008 , rather than to share information.
Our work also advances theory regarding how buyers pressure suppliers to adopt particular standards and practices. Prior studies have predicted suppliers' adoption and compliance behaviors based on transaction cost economics, market power arguments, signaling theory, and institutional theory (Barrientos and Smith 2006 , Delmas and Montiel 2009 , Delmas and Toffel 2008 , Gopal and Gao 2009 .
By capturing the prevalence of buyer requests, we apply social movement theory to portray how firms seek to cascade practices through their supply chains. Whereas the social movement literature typically examines how activist groups use boycotts, strikes, media campaigns, and shareholder resolutions to try to catalyze changes in organizational behaviors (Della Porta and Diani 2006 , King and Pearce 2010 , Davis et al. 2005 , Reid and Toffel 2009 , we explore a novel social movement tactic and instigator by examining how companies are using procurement preferences to catalyze behavioral changes in their suppliers. In assessing the determinants of suppliers' decisions of whether or not to share information with their buyers-and, if so, how much-we also theoretically distinguish between two forms of buyer pressure:
(1) the breadth of buyer pressure, indicative of a social movement (measured via the number of buyer requests), and (2) market power, measured via the revenues of a supplier's largest requesting buyer. We find evidence that the former but not the latter is positively associated with suppliers sharing climate change information with buyers, suggesting that considering the breadth of requests and not merely market power presents a more complete picture of the determinants of supplier's adoption of practices and standards.
Our finding that suppliers in more profitable industries are especially likely to share climate change information with their buyers relates to the literature on how information sharing is influenced by competition, to the extent that more competitive industries are less profitable (Smith 1776 , McNulty 1996 . For example, several prior studies have shown that the presence of horizontal competition in a supply chain affects supply chain partners' decisions to share demand, cost, and inventory information (Li 2002, Li and Zhang 2008) . Depending on their assumptions, some models predict greater disclosure resulting from more competition (Li 2002 , Darrough and Stoughton 1990 , Verrecchia 1983 , while others predict less (e.g., Arya and Mittendorf 2007, Clinch and Verrecchia 1997) . Empirical work has also yielded mixed results (Healy and Palepu 2001, Arya and Mittendorf 2007) . To the extent that an industry's profitability negatively correlates with competition within that industry, our empirical results support the idea that more competition appears to discourage the form of information disclosure we examine.
Our research also offers managerial insights, especially as growing awareness of climate change makes collaboration between suppliers and buyers increasingly important. For buyers, our finding that both buyer commitment and the number of buyer requests affect a supplier's likelihood of sharing information suggests that buyers can obtain more information from suppliers not only by investing in activities to convince suppliers of the importance of this information, but also by collaborating with other buyers to send this message collectively.
Understanding how the profitability and GHG-intensity of a supplier's industry influences the supplier's willingness to share climate change information is relevant to buyers and to policymakers. For a buyer, knowing better how to differentiate its efforts to encourage suppliers to respond allows it to allocate its resources more efficiently. Policymakers, increasingly interested in fostering disclosure of GHG emissions, can better gauge where to target disclosure regulations and enforcement efforts. Firms in more profitable industries are particularly likely to publicly disclose climate change information irrespective of GHG regulatory requirements, which suggests that governments can more readily rely on market-driven requests for firm-level supply chain information (e.g., Gunther 2010 , Obama 2009 ) to obtain this information from firms in more profitable industries, but that mandatory information disclosure regulations (e.g., U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2012) might be needed to compel disclosure by firms in less profitable industries.
Limitations and Future Work
Although our dataset provides an unusual opportunity to analyze responses from thousands of suppliers around the world, our analysis is subject to important limitations.
Because buyers self-selected into the CDP Supply Chain Program, the generalizability of our results could be called into question especially if the participating buyer differed substantially from nonparticipant buyers. In our interviews, CDP staff suggested that buyers participating in the CDP Supply
Chain project tended to be more concerned about and active in climate change and sustainability issues.
We explore the extent to which participating buyers differed from comparable non-participant buyers by We exploit this difference to gain insight on the extent to which buyers' self-selecting into the CDP Supply Chain project might impede the generalizability of our results to the relationships future participant buyers might face. We look for heterogeneity in the estimated hypothesized relationships within our subsample, focusing on those suppliers with at least one requesting buyer that is a member of the S&P 500 and FTSE 350. We compare the estimates of our primary model on the subset of suppliers that have at least one requesting buyer that is a CDLI member to the estimates on the subset of suppliers that do not have any requesting buyers that are a CDLI member.
The extent to which our results might generalize to non-participant buyers could be called into question if the hypothesized coefficients differed between these subsets, because the population of non-participants buyers is disproportionately non-members of CDLI. Estimating the primary model on these two 27 We focused on the S&P 500 and FTSE 350 because 38 of the 68 (56%) buyers in the CDP Supply Chain Program are members of these indices, and fewer than five buyers are in any of the other individual indices covered by the CDP investor survey. 28 We also estimated a logistic regression to predict a firm's participation as a buyer in the CDP Supply Chain Program based on being a carbon disclosure leader, log of sales and of employment (both lagged one year), and fixed effects for industry, country, and year. These results also confirmed that being a carbon disclosure leader was significantly positively associated with participating in the CDP Supply Chain Program (=1.75, p<0.01), with the predicted probability of increasing from 2.6% vs. 11.1%. Moreover, simply choosing to participate in the CDP Supply Chain program might send a sufficiently strong signal to suppliers that the buyer is very interested in this information. This would imply that our results generalize to all other buyers who might participate. It also would also suggest that our results might underestimate the true effect on supplier responsiveness from buyers using scorecards or
RFPs to convey their commitment to using this climate change information in future procurement decisions. That is, if merely participating in the CDP Supply Chain already communicates some level of commitment, then the effects of scorecards or RFPs might be attenuated in our context, and using these tools outside of the CDP Supply Chain Program would to be even more effective in prompting supplier responses.
Buyers' requesting climate change information from a subset of their suppliers might evoke a concern about whether our results accurately generalize to all of their suppliers. 29 Generalizing to other suppliers might not actually be an important concern in practice because, as noted earlier, most buyers in the CDP Supply Chain program request climate change information from all suppliers that constituted 80-90% of the buyer's total spend on suppliers (Communication with CDP Personnel, May 2012). Analyzing the relationships pertaining to these suppliers is not only the feasible set due to data availability, but also the relevant set of suppliers because this prioritization approach is widely acknowledged and endorsed by the Greenhouse Gas Protocol standard governing Scope 3 GHG emissions. 30 For those nonetheless interested in the extent to which our results might generalize to buyers' other suppliers, logical arguments support the notion that our results might either underestimate or overestimate an average effect across all 29 A more nuanced concern might arise from buyers pursuing distinct strategies to select suppliers (e.g., largest spend versus particular countries). If this observed disparity resulted in variation correlated with buyer attributes and suppliers' responsiveness, omitted variable bias could result. We believe this is not a major concern in our context because there is not much variation in selection strategies among buyers in our sample: the vast majority of buyers chose suppliers based on largest spend (Communication with CDP Personnel, May 2012). The minor variation in buyers' supplier selection strategies tended to differ across, rather than within, industries, according to our interviews with CDP staff. Given that we control for differences across industries using fixed effects, we believe it unlikely that our analysis is contaminated by omitted variable bias resulting from buyers pursuing different strategies to select suppliers. 30 Specifically, the standard includes the following guidance: "a company may select suppliers based on their contribution to its total spend" (Greenhouse Gas Protocol 2012: 78).
suppliers to our buyers. 31 Our results pertaining to the number of buyer requests and buyers' commitment to use shared information in future procurement decisions might underestimate an average effect across all suppliers if the highest-spend suppliers (those sent the questionnaire) are particularly likely to operate with relative impunity under the assumption that the requesting buyers are particularly vulnerable to them. 32 In this scenario, compared to the suppliers we studied, the buyers' remaining suppliers (those not sent the questionnaire) might be more responsive, perceiving a greater need to comply with requests from these buyers. In contrast, our results might overestimate an average effect across all suppliers if the buyers represented a particularly high portion of their selected suppliers' sales. 33 In this scenario, the chosen suppliers might be especially vulnerable to these buyers and would be particularly eager to respond in order to retain their business, even more so if they received several requests and if these buyers use climate change in their procurement criteria. The suppliers not sent the questionnaire would accordingly be less responsive, perceiving less of a need to comply with requests from these buyers. To investigate the extent to which responsiveness relationships based primarily on largest-spend suppliers generalize to a buyer's remaining suppliers, or whether they represent under-or overestimates, future research could gather data on how buyers select suppliers to request information to assess differences in responses between suppliers chosen based on different selection criteria.
Our inability to match all buyers' and suppliers' revenues with information from Capital IQ might also be a potential source of bias. The companies for which we were unable to obtain revenue data from
Capital IQ tended to be privately held and might therefore face less pressure to disclose climate change information.
The number of buyer requests could be subject to measurement error if suppliers in our sample receive similar buyer requests to share climate change information through channels other than CDP and if this affects their responsiveness to the frequency of requests they receive from buyers through CDP.
We explored for this effect by estimating our primary model on three subsamples split according to supplier size (split at the 33rd and 66th percentiles). While the coefficients on the number of buyer requests were progressively smaller in magnitude on the subsamples of larger suppliers, suggesting decreasing responsiveness resulting from the number of requests, these coefficients did not significantly 31 Another approach might be to estimate a two-stage Heckman model where the first stage distinguishes suppliers selected for this information request from buyer's remaining suppliers, and the second stage assessing the hypothesized relationships among the former. Unfortunately, in most contexts including ours, each buyer's complete set of suppliers is typically proprietary, which prevents us from conducting a two-stage analysis. 32 This is only a concern to the extent that these largest-spend suppliers are not readily replaceable. 33 We have no information on the proportion of suppliers' sales flow to these buyers, and thus have no indication that the chosen suppliers are particularly dependent on these buyers. differ across the adjacent subsamples. Thus, while we find no evidence of this measurement error, we acknowledge it might affect our results.
It remains unclear to what extent our results generalize to sharing information in the contexts of emerging social movements other than climate change and to more conventional contexts in which buyers seek supply chain data such as workplace conditions and quality management practices. Our conversations with buyers and CDP representatives suggested that buyers are somewhat permissive with respect to suppliers' limited activities regarding climate change-including sharing information about their climate change vulnerabilities, GHG emissions levels, and GHG or energy reduction targetsbecause these are an emerging phenomenon and most buyers are still exploring how to work with their suppliers to begin learning about and managing these aspects of their supply chains rather than trying to punish suppliers for poor performance. Research in more established domains could help identify circumstances in which buyer commitment to use the information discourages information sharing, in contrast to our finding that it encouraged information sharing.
Future research could also explore the extent to which additional factors encourage information sharing in supply chains. For example, newer companies might be less likely to share climate change information if they have not had time to install comprehensive measurement systems to monitor nonfinancial indicators such as GHG emissions. We were unable to obtain company age data for our global sample, since it includes many privately owned companies, but we encourage future researchers to consider the role of company age in disclosure decisions. In addition, resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) implies that a supplier would be especially likely to respond to requests from buyers upon which it is heavily dependent. This behavior might extend to sharing information and the duration of a buyer-supplier relationship might also affect a supplier's responsiveness to information requests from that buyer. Data limitations prevent us from exploring such relationships in our context, but we encourage researchers with access to suppliers' revenue streams from various buyers to identify whether and how resource dependency operates in the realm of information sharing in supply chains. Future research can also examine how a supplier's position in the supply chain influences its decision to share information with its buyers. For example, suppliers that are closer or more visible to consumers might feel more pressure to disclose in order to maintain legitimacy.
Future field research could also pursue a deeper analysis of how information disclosure decisions are influenced by the particular staff function and the seniority of the staff members that handle the information request, on both the buyer's and the supplier's side (Delmas and Toffel 2008) . We heard anecdotal evidence from CDP that requests from buyers' procurement managers were more likely to get a response than requests from environmental managers, perhaps because procurement managers could issue Future work should also investigate temporal dynamics that we were unable to explore in a dataset spanning only two years. For example, research could identify the factors associated with rapid increases in the quantity and quality of disclosed information and the conditions under which sharing environmental information with buyers leads to enhanced-or deteriorated-relationships.
As an increasing number of firms seek to manage their supply chain GHG emissions and vulnerability to the physical and regulatory threats associated with global climate change, the need for information from suppliers is growing. Our research sheds light on what makes suppliers more or less likely to share that information with buyers. Such insights can benefit practitioners while contributing to the scholarly literatures on information sharing in supply chains, the diffusion of social and environmental practices through supply chains, and environmental information disclosure. Mean buyer requests per industry-year ( § denotes variables lagged one year. The baseline (omitted) industry is Industrials (N = 753). All models also include dummies for year 2010 and unknown industry as well as dummy variables denoting instances in which the following variables were recoded from missing to zero: industry's GHG intensity (N = 569), supplier's revenue (N = 2,063), and country's environmental governance (N = 4). Models 2-4 also include dummy variables to denote instances in which largest buyer's revenue (N=262) and median profit margin (N = 540) were recoded from missing to zero. 
